Masakata Ogawa
Faculty of Education
Ibaraki University
Mito, Ibaraki 310-8512
JAPAN
E-mail: ogawam@mito.ipc.ibaraki.ac.jp
 

Introduction

Researchers in science education have held several positions toward the
relation between science and culture. An earlier stance saw traditional
culture as a barrier of science teaching and learning (for example, Wilson,
1981). This research has uncovered various kinds of cultural factors that
inhibit an effective learning of science; factors such as: indigenous
worldviews, language, customs, and human relationships. The most common
concern among these science educators is how to eliminate such negative
factors from science teaching/learning settings.

In another category of research, science educators have been interested in
alternative knowledge systems that explain our world, especially knowledge
systems found in certain traditional cultures. In this category, traditional
worldviews or knowledge systems on natural phenomena are usually regarded as
a comparable with those of Western science. Science educators in this group
do not hesitate to respect such alternative knowledge systems, and they
sometimes include such knowledge systems in their science classes. One
example is the recent interest in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in
the context of science education (Snively, 1995).

A third category of research addresses the contribution of various cultures
to Western science. In the developmental process of Western science, ideas
from various cultures (Chinese, Islamic, African and so on) have been taken
up by science. In addition, many scientists and engineers from various
cultures contribute to contemporary science and technological research
fields. The multicultural science education movement (for example, Atwater
and Riley, 1993; Reiss, 1993) may fit this category. Committed science
educators develop teaching materials comprised of many episodes describing
such contributions (for example, Addison-Wesley, 1993). This stance is
popular among recent official science standards in several countries.

However, there are not as many science educators whose interest lies in the
'culturality' of science itself. In this last category of research, science
is regarded as a kind of culture. The cultural aspects of science become one
major focus in classrooms. For example, Ogawa (1986) proposes that Western
science be viewed as a foreign culture to non-westerners. Aikenhead (1996,
1997) adopts the idea of 'cultural border crossing,' in which science
culture is identified as one of the subcultures within Western culture, and
thus called subculture science.

This short essay is based on this last category of research. It first
examines the culturality of science, focusing on 'science as the culture of
scientific community.' Next, it uncovers the nature of 'scientism' that
accompanies science culture and that is found in science education
documents. Lastly, this essay discusses how one might cope with scientism
when teaching science.
 

Science in a Multiscience Perspective

What is science when we refer to science education? This question may be
curious for conventional science educators, because for them science is
science. However, I think that this question is the very beginning of a new
perspective for science education. When I started my thinking of 'science
in science education' issue as a Japanese science educator, my fundamental
presupposition on 'science' has been 'science as a foreign culture for the
Japanese' (Ogawa, 1986). Science, which can be usually mentioned as Western
science, was not Japanese original but an imported one from western world
during mid 19th century. Despite of this fact, why could the Japanese learn
science? While I have been struggling with this question, it has given me
fruitful ideas on how science education should be. And recently I proposed
the idea, 'science education in multiscience perspective' (Ogawa, 1995b)
through such struggle. Let me begin with summarizing it briefly.

Ogawa (1995b) adopts a rather broader definition of science; that is, 'a
rational perceiving of reality' where 'perceiving' means both 'the action
constructing reality and construct of reality' (p.588). Caution should be
taken that the 'rationality' in this context never means Western modern
rationality alone. If 'rational' is the correct term for behavior in
accordance with rules, there can be a kind of rationality in each culture.
Then he distinguishes three types of 'science.'

The first type, 'indigenous science' is defined as 'a culture-dependent
collective rational perceiving of reality', where 'collective' means held in
sufficiently similar form by many persons to allow effective communication,
but independent of any particular mind or set of minds (p.588). It is the
science in a certain culture. This comes, for example, from Yamada's (1970)
view, 'every society and culture has its own science, and its function is
sustaining its mother society and culture.' Indigenous science is held by a
specific cultural group, not by a specific individual. Indigenous science
may be of a nature such that even individuals living in that culture may
neither recognize its existence nor be aware of being governed by it
tacitly. Also, indigenous science might be tacitly transferred from
generation to generation through daily social and cultural events. An
individual cannot express indigenous science as a kind of specific
theoretical system. Rather, indigenous science is, so to speak, only
collectively lived in and collectively experienced by the people of that
culture (pp.585-586).

The second type, 'personal science' is the science at the personal level and
defined as 'a rational perceiving of reality, which is unique to each
individual' (p.588).

The last type of science is Western modern science, which is defined as 'a
collective rational perceiving of reality, which is shared and authorized by
the scientific community' (p.589). Western modern science is justified only
by the scientific community itself. All other institutions have been
excluded from the 'inquisition' of scientific justification, and are
expected to accept it without objections or doubts. While the former two
types of science pertain to the every-day-life world, characterized by a
human vitality and purpose found in the descriptions and explanations of
what scientists called natural phenomena, Western modern science pertains to
a Cartesian materialistic world in which humans are seen in reductionistic
and mechanistic terms (p.589). While indigenous science and personal science
treat the everyday-life world, Western modern science treats the scientists'
theoretical world. Thus, we science educators are just in the multiscience
setting.

Definition of science as 'a rational perceiving of reality' seems to be
acceptable by a certain group of science educators (Aikenhead and Huntley,
1997). This kind of treatment is one of the very beginnings of relief from
our fixed idea on science held for a long time without any doubt on its
legitimacy.
 

Science as the Culture of Scientific Community

The above discussion also shows us another interesting viewpoint. If
'western modern science' is defined as 'a collective rational perceiving of
reality, which is shared and authorized by the scientific community,'
'western modern science' can be regarded as the science of a specific
professionals named scientists. Or, in fact, we can say that what I call
'western modern science' is the Culture of Scientific Community. I would
like to do emphasis on the very nature of 'scientists' culture' in this
essay.

Is it ever possible to use the term, 'culture' in this case? For example, an
cultural anthropologist Keesing (1976), in his textbook, uses 'culture' to
'refer to systems of shared ideas, to the conceptual designs, the shared
systems of meaning, that underlie the ways in which a people live.' (p.139)
In this definition, if we can change the phrase, 'the ways in which a people
live' into 'the ways in which a people named scientist work,' we will obtain
an interesting definition of science-as-culture. That is, 'science' refers
to 'systems of shared ideas, to the conceptual designs, the shared systems
of meaning, that underlie the ways in which a people named scientist work.'
I do not feel any problem on this definition of 'science,' in considering
what I have been calling 'western modern science.'

Once we accept the usage of 'science as the culture of scientific
community,' we can describe it more in detail. 'Western modern science' is a
total body of specific ways of recognizing the world and its resultant image
of the world, which is held by, maintained by, developed by the group of
people, who, regardless of their gender and/or socio-cultural origin, works
as a social function called 'scientist,' (Ogawa, 1995a) and at the same
time, it is only the group that guarantees legitimacy of 'western modern
science.'

An important point is that scientist is one of the professionals in our
contemporary society. This immediately implies two things. One is that every
scientist does not belong to the same specific indigenous culture world
(Indigenous Science, in my usage of multiscience perspective), because not
only western peoples but also non-western peoples serve as professional
scientists. The other is that scientists in our contemporary society are one
of the jobs, and therefore, they do not always think, act, behave, and live
as 'scientists' in their daily lives. While they, in principle, live in
their respective indigenous culture world just as their family members or
neighborhood do, they go into the western modern science world as a specific
professional named scientist. In this sense, I am doubting the usage,
'western' modern science. We need not to add the adjective 'western' when
referring to modern science, though I realize that the ways of knowing in
and the origin of modern science are heavily dependent upon western culture.
On the contrary, if we call it simply 'modern science,' then the issue what
is the indigenous science for westerners seems to be more realistic and of
worth reexamining.

One of the major characteristics of the culture named modern science seems
to be its perfect 'closedness' within the group members. This is a very
different kind of 'closedness' of science, when compared with the view on
'closedness vs openness' shown in Robin Horton's memorable papers (1967).
His major finding of the very difference between African traditional thought
and western science was the scheme, 'closedness of traditional thought' vs
'openness of scientifically oriented cultures.' The 'closedness of
traditional thought' is derived from the nature that it rejects alternatives
of ways of thinking, while 'openness of scientifically oriented cultures' is
identified from the fact that it allows possible alternatives of theories or
concepts. This discussion is limited within thought systems.

However, there is another aspect; actors in science. Deliberation leads us
to ask who can allow to propose such alternatives? They are scientists
alone. Non-scientists can neither take part in the endeavor of revision of
modern science theories or concepts, nor in the process of 'inquisition.'
Scientists always insist that modern science is open to anybody, modern
science theories are open to any kinds of criticism, and open to the claim
of revision. Furthermore, general public also believe that such view is
correct. However, I think it is an illusion. Only those who declare that
they obey any rules, customs, norms or cultural code of scientific
community, that is, scientists, can receive the right to make claims to the
discourses in modern science. Or, in reverse, if you want to join such
activities, you should declare to respect and obey the cultural code of
scientific community before doing so. This means that the fundamental base
on which scientific community stands is never attacked or out of debate.
Thus, I cannot but think that it is the superficial openness of scientific
community. 'Science-as-culture' may be one of the most closed cultures in
the world, and is never open to everybody. Why can such closed culture be
learned by everybody?

Scientists believe in the deed (scientific activities) they are involved in,
and the products (science theories and concepts) they have made up, because
they believe that they are pursuing the truth. Also they are unaware of
their own value system and they unconsciously force general public to accept
their own value system as the true value system, but it is clear that this
value system, just as others, is valid only within scientific community. Of
course, I do respect the beliefs of scientific community, but do at the same
time have some doubts on the position that such beliefs should be involved
in science education programs for general public in various cultural
settings. Probably, this issue will be one of the most critical ones, but in
most cases it is missing when considering the foundations of science
education. In the next section I will discuss the issue from the viewpoint
of scientism.
 

Scientism embedded in Scientific Community

'Scientism' is a popular term among certain science educators, but consensus
on the definition is illusive. For example, Cobern (1994, p.585) writes,
'Though recognizing the tentative nature of all scientific knowledge,
scientism imbues scientific knowledge with a Laplacian certainty denied all
other disciplines, thus giving science an a priori status in the
intellectual world.' Also, John Ziman (1980) writes as follows:

It (Scientism) reinforces, without question or comment, the widespread
sentiment that science should be the only authority for belief and the only
criterion for action..... The trouble with scientism is that it takes as
given an attitude 'for' science, without deeper analysis. This attitude
provokes naive forms of antiscientism which are equally sterile. The very
questions that are to be answered in the attempt to formulate satisfactory
opinions about the role, value, use, etc., of science have already been
begged. (p.33)

Habermas (1974) uses a rather simple definition of scientism: 'science's
belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand
science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify
knowledge with science' (p.4). Here, I also define scientism as 'an ideology
that identifies valid knowledge only with science.'

Scientism in this sense comes out as its most visible forms of (1)
unconditional belief in science and (2) uncritical confidence of valuing
application of science into life-world settings. Here, I would like to
discuss briefly on the nature of these two points.

(1) Unconditional Belief in Science

I have proposed the need to distinguish 'understanding science' from
'believing in science' (Ogawa, 1997b). A belief in science, scientific
attitudes, and scientific ways of thinking is, I think, deeply rooted in
western value system, which is well shared among Western traditional
cultures. And it is well shared among many western science educators as well
as scientists, I suppose. Thus, Ogawa (1997b) argues:

We can be allowed to have an option to take a stance that 'I can understand
what western modern science world really is, but cannot believe in it !!' My
position is that whether one can believe in science and scientific worldview
or not should be determined, not by the value within western modern science,
but by the value within the daily life world of the people concerned. (p.9)

Findings in science studies (for example, Richards, 1983; Duschl,1994)
clearly indicate that science is a kind of human endeavor among other
endeavors, and thus the discourses in science are not the absolute truth but
relative to other endeavors than science. The scientific worldview is one
kind of worldview, which is commonly produced and held by the workers named
'scientists.' Believing in science or a scientific worldview as the only one
true worldview is an ideology that I call 'scientism', which is mainly held
and authorized by scientists and most of science educators, and they
unconsciously forces general public in any cultural settings to accept and
share it.

The world of modern science is, so to speak, a world seen through a kind of
eyeglasses (see Hanson, 1969), or a kind of 'representation' of the world.
Note that never is it reality itself, nor does modern science command us to
wear it. The decision whether or not one believes in the truthfulness of
modern science as if it were reality itself or she/he even wants to alter
reality by applying the theories or laws embedded in modern science to it,
is left to her/himself.

Considering science education, you may ask; 'Is it possible to understand
modern science without believing in its truthfulness?' I would like to
answer to it by saying 'Yes'. Understanding modern science as the culture
of scientists is, in principle, open to every one, but believing in its
truthfulness must be a rather value-laden or culture-dependent action for
everyone. Even scientists can, in principle, understand, work in, and
contribute to modern science without believing in the truthfulness of modern
science. This is one reason why non-westerners can be scientists without
losing their identity. While I admit in certain socio-cultural settings
'belief in science' be accepted and shared in their community, I would argue
that 'belief in science' should not be forced to 'all' people with different
value systems in science education setting. Responsibility of science
educators in respective socio-cultural contexts is quite crucial in this
very point.

(2) Uncritical Conviction of Valuing Application of Science into the Life
World

On the next point, we should be aware of the relation between the
theoretical world produced by scientists and applying the mechanisms in the
theoretical world to the life-world in order to change it. It is a popular
understanding that in Western philosophical tradition, the scientific
worldview and its applicability to the life-world are so closely linked as
to be inseparable. (Remember the relationship among God, Nature, and Human
being.) Human being alone is believed to have a right and capability to
uncover and understand the power governing Nature and control Nature by
applying the resultant knowledge to Nature itself. However, such
philosophical tradition cannot be shared among various peoples in the world;
Or even the concepts, God, Nature, and Human being, are so unique ones in
Western philosophical tradition and they are culture-dependent products.

Also, there is an interesting story on this issue (Ogawa, 1995a). Sano
(1989) discusses that in 17th to 18th centuries in Europe, science (of
course, there is no distinction between science and technology at that
time.) was socially recognized as the 'usable' science, an ideology of
'practical science'; This means that 'usability of science' was based upon
western value system. An ideology of 'science as an liberal art,' that is,
epistemological value of science was newly invented by scientific community
itself during 19th century when scientific community was eager to be
involved in the university system at that time. This story suggests that
science was originally recognized, not as the theoretical worldview, but as
its usability and applicability. Thus, the inseparability of science and its
applicability has a long history and thus, scientific community has been
presupposing, that is, tacitly holding this inseparability, and still be
difficult to realize that they are separable.

I argue, however, that they should be separated from each other, because the
idea of this inseparability comes only from the Western traditional value
system, which is an important factor of scientism. How to cope with, or
manage, the relation between science and its applicability and usability
should be determined by a kind of wisdom that is deeply linked to a value
system pervading the life-world setting of learners.
 

Scientism Found in Science Education Policy Documents

One of the representations of scientism, 'unconditional belief in science'
is clearly found in recent documents on science education by scientific
community and majority of science educators does agree with such statements
without any doubt. For example, A Project 2061 Report, 'Science for all
American,' (AAAS, 1989; p.12) writes as 'science education - meaning
education in science, mathematics, and technology - should help students to
develop the understandings and habits of mind they need to become
compassionate human beings able to think for themselves and to face life
head on.' International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) issued the
Report on their programme on Capacity Building in Science in 1996. It writes
that 'Indeed, the very habitability of the planet will depend on global
popular consensus. As such, the spread of scientific culture, of scientific
ways of thinking, and of knowledge is tied to the fate of humanity.' (ICSU
Report, 1998; p.73)

On the second point, 'uncritical confidence of valuing application of
science into life-world settings' is also found in many science education
policy documents. For example, in the Project 2061 Report, Science for all
American (AAAS, 1989) we can find the statements like;

Although many pressing global and local problems have technological origins,
technology provides the tools for dealing with such problems, and the
instruments for generating, through science, crucial new knowledge; without
the continuous development and creative use of new technologies, society
will limit its capability for survival and for working toward a world in
which the human species is at peace with itself and its environment. (p.13)

Also, in the ICSU report mentioned above they writes 'To build capacity in
science is to enable nations and regions to make use of science and
technology for the well being and culture of their citizens. In a world
whose questionable future is absolutely dependent on the advance of science
and its wise application, the scientific illiteracy of the peoples of the
world (and of so many of their leaders) present a universal crisis which
transcends North-South, developing and developed, rich and poor.' (ICSU
Report, 1998; pp.73-74)

Such types of scientism is also found as a guiding principle in major
science education documents compiled by science educators. For example,
National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996)
declares as follows;

All of us have a stake, as individuals and as a society, in scientific
literacy. An understanding of science makes it possible for everyone to
share in the richness and excitement of comprehending the natural world.
Scientific literacy enables people to use scientific principles and
processes in making personal decisions and to participate in discussions of
scientific issues that affect society. A sound grounding in science
strengthens many of the skills that people use every day, like solving
problems creatively, thinking critically, working cooperatively in teams,
using technology effectively, and valuing life-long learning. And economic
productivity of our society is tightly linked to the scientific and
technological skills of our work force. (ix)

The fact that such scientism is really found in the documents compiled by
science educators shows that they share the value of scientific community.
If so, scientism in science education contexts expresses itself
unconsciously by compelling learners (1) to believe in science, and (2) to
be convinced of the value of applying or using science into life-world
settings. However, these two points are not given a priori. They are
strictly connected with western value system. I have been arguing against
this manifestation of scientism (Ogawa,1995a; 1996; 1997a; 1997b). Of
course, I do not want to mention that it is wrong, but that it is one of the
stances science educators can take. What I want to argue is that science
educators must decide whether or not they share the value of scientific
community before thinking of science education policy issue in their
respective contexts.
 

What is the Worth Teaching/Learning the Culture of Scientific Community?

How can we cope with scientism in science teaching settings? My opinion is
that science educators should be more careful to be 'spokesman' or
'supporter' of scientific community, though I do not want to deny that
scientists serve as science teachers in person, or vice versa. The public
role of science teachers, especially in not-so-familiar-with-science-culture
settings, should be to explain and teach various aspect of science, not from
within the viewpoint of scientific community, but from the viewpoint of
'outsider' of scientific community. They do not necessarily force learners
to believe in modern science. Therefore, science teachers should have
broader perspectives on modern science than scientists do. From this point,
the idea of 'cultural broker' Aikenhead (1996) proposes is worth
re-examining more precisely.

Then, what is the value of modern science to teach or learn if modern
science is regarded as the culture of scientific community?* One possible
answer is because it is one of the important cultural heritage of the human
beings. However, there is more important aspect. That is, 'culture of
scientific community' as one of the mirrors to reflect learners' own
'science' (Ogawa*s usage) (Ogawa, 1995b).

A person living in a certain culture has her/his own personal science, but
for her/him is it difficult to understand or be aware of the corresponding
indigenous science as such directly. In general, one can understand or be
aware of what something is alike or not alike by the process of comparing it
with other things. In that process, we can use the others as the mirror for
reflecting the target thing. As such, one needs mirrors to reflect
indigenous science in order to get qualified information on indigenous
science as well as on personal science. I think that indigenous sciences and
personal sciences other than their own are possible mirrors. Furthermore,
modern science is an excellent mirror for that use. The reverse is also
true. We can get better understanding of modern science in comparison with
indigenous science or personal science than we can do when modern science is
set alone. This is the very positive value for laymen to be taught or learn
modern science. It is through this comparative treatment of modern science,
indigenous science, and personal science that 'science' education has its
own value in a certain culture. In this sense, Jegede's collateral learning
(Jegede, 1995), Ogunniyi's contiguity learning hypothesis (Ogunniyi, 1997),
Aikenhead's anthropological learning (Aikenhead, 1997), and my multiscience
perspective (Ogawa, 1995b) seem to be similar ideas, which are worth
examining.

However, one thing must be mentioned. That is, each science is, in
principle, incommensurable. It is impossible for us to compare a component
(say a specific object, concept, or theory) in a certain science with an
apparently correspondent component in another science without considering
the whole system of each science. For example, what 'the sun' signifies or
means in a certain science is quite different from what 'the sun' signifies
or means in another science. 'The sun' in the first system has no habitat in
the second system of science, and vice versa. We should understand 'the sun'
with fully appreciating the relevant whole system of science. (see Gough,
1998)
 

Postscript

My idea may give you an impression that I want to deny the value of modern
science. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimate goal of my struggle is to find
out wisdom to manage contemporary Japanese society, which is so much
technologicalized and self-developing one (Ogawa, 1998a).

One of the major characteristics of the society is, as a Japanese
philosopher Nakano (1988) suggests, that the society itself has a nature of
autonomy and it develops as if it had its own will and it is beyond the
control of the people living there. While people believe that they do
produce and control such social systems as well as tools, machines,
apparatus and so on, actually it is the social systems that control human
mind as well as human behavior. Goods produced sometimes force us to use
them (remember the case of portable cellular phone system in Japan). The
technologicalized and self-developing society, as Nakano argues, can invade
people's body and mind, and give significant effects to the subjectiveness
like feelings, thought, intention, and affection in their deeper parts, and
even in some cases, determine the subjectivity.

In such a society, modern science and science-driven technology are critical
factors. Thus, I think one of most urgent social role of science educators
must be to search for wisdom to manage modern science and science-driven
technology. I have not yet found out such wisdom, but I continue to do so by
surveying various kinds of wisdom appearing in our history and in indigenous
wisdom in our present day. Modern science is of course one possible wisdom,
but this does not mean we cannot find out another kind of wisdom in the
future. One important point we should remind is that wisdom in almost every
cultural setting had developed in its long history without any idea or
awareness of 'finiteness of the earth.' Pursuit of new types of wisdom,
which is based upon the 'finiteness of the earth' and manage modern science
and science-driven technology, will be emergent need for science educators.
Science educators should be always sensitive to another kind of wisdom than
modern science. On the one hand, they should think of how to teach modern
science, and on the other hand, they should also think of what is another
kind of wisdom to manage contemporary technologicalized society.

Such struggle guides me to reexamine the fundamental issues in science
education. I am not so sure whether or not I am coming to my goal, but I
would invite colleagues to join my struggle.
 
 

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